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THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF LIENS
Edward 1. Janger*
Thomas Jackson, in his iconic book, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law, seeks to establish both a distributional baseline for
bankruptcy reorganizations and a normative set of limits for bank-
ruptcy policy. Nonbankruptcy entitlements should establish both the
distributional priorities and the distributional floor in a bankruptcy
case. A number of normative prescriptions follow. Equity should not
seek reorganization on the backs of the unsecured credi-
tors. Bankruptcy-specific priorities should be avoided, to the extent
possible to avoid "forum shopping" into bankruptcy (unless, of
course, bankruptcy is a more efficient forum). Most importantly,
however, the rights of secured creditors should be respected.
Professor Janger argues that, paradoxically, bankruptcy courts
have become the preferred venue for realizing value on a secured
creditors' collateral, and that Jackson's rhetoric has allowed secured
creditors to capture bankruptcy created value that is not necessarily
allocated to them by the statute. Specifically, undersecured creditors
argue that they have a blanket lien on all of the debtor's assets and
should have the power to determine their disposition. This article first
seeks to reestablish the Jacksonian balance by arguing that state law
security schemes do not provide for the creation of blanket liens that
capture enterprise value, but instead create asset specific security de-
vices that are limited in scope, and are not calculated to maximize
value.
It then seeks to establish three key points, and develop their im-
plications. The points are (1) an ownership rule, (2) a realization rule,
and (3) an equitable tracing-or "no moving up"-rule. The owner-
ship rule is that baseline entitlements of a secured creditor in bank-
ruptcy are established by what could have actually been realized by
that creditor outside of bankruptcy. The realization rule is that, unless
the statute specifies otherwise, the baseline entitlement is valued as of
the petition date. The equitable tracing rule recognizes the limits of
the state law definition of proceeds and the limits of equitable tracing
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that Melissa Jacoby and I first articulated in our recent article, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of
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to freeze the relative position of creditors on the date of the bankrupt-
cy filing, and limit the ability of secured creditors to use their proper-
ty-based claims to "roll up" all of the bankruptcy-created value.
These three rules, if applied consistently, should encourage efficient
value-maximizing governance of the debtor firm and fair allocation
of bankruptcy-created value among its creditors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jackson, in his iconic book, The Logic and Limits of Bank-
ruptcy Law, seeks to establish both a distributional baseline for bank-
ruptcy reorganizations and a normative set of limits for bankruptcy poli-
cy.' As he sees it, state law (or, more accurately, nonbankruptcy)
entitlements establish both the distributional priorities and the distribu-
tional floor in a bankruptcy case.' Bankruptcy law exists solely because
the first-in-time nature of state law remedies can lead to a race of dili-
gence and inefficient dismemberment of viable debtors.3 Thus, the pur-
pose of bankruptcy policy should be limited to avoiding these inefficient
liquidations -preserving going concern value where it exists, while re-
specting nonbankruptcy distributional priorities.
Value maximization and Pareto optimality are hard goals to argue
with, but as limiting principles they are more controversial.4 A number of
1. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 84.
4. For the purposes of this Article, I accept these limits, as they represent a least common de-
nominator for bankruptcy scholars. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial
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normative prescriptions follow. Equity should not seek reorganization on
the backs of the unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy-specific priorities
should be avoided, to limit "forum shopping" into bankruptcy (unless, of
course, bankruptcy is a more efficient forum).' Most importantly, howev-
er, the rights of secured creditors should be respected.'
The Jacksonian prescription to respect a secured creditor's non-
bankruptcy rights has been at the base of many of the most celebrated
bankruptcy disputes of the last thirty years. To wit: Should undersecured
creditors be compensated for the delay in foreclosure caused by the au-
tomatic stay (Timbers)?T Does the absolute priority rule permit the se-
cured creditor to propose a "gift plan" (DBSD)? Does a secured credi-
tor have the absolute right to credit bid in a sale under a plan
(RadLAX)?9
I argue in this Article, however, that routine invocation of this pre-
scription has actually led to a significant expansion of secured creditors'
rights, well beyond what they could achieve under state law and, perhaps,
beyond what the Bankruptcy Code prescribes.
The contested questions raised by Jackson's paean to Butner0 can
be broadly reframed as: (1) what can a secured creditor insist on in
cramdown; and (2) when should a secured creditor be able to assert gov-
ernance rights over its collateral, and hence over the debtor's decision
whether to reorganize or liquidate?" In the years that have followed,
courts and lawyers have accepted a formal and expansive view of the se-
cured creditors' entitlement on both fronts.1 2 As a result, notwithstanding
considerable secured creditor bellyaching, current bankruptcy practice
allows creditors with consensual liens to obtain (and perhaps insist on) a
greater recovery in bankruptcy than would be available under other
law." This is true on both a practical and a formal level. Bankruptcy has
turned into a phenomenally effective foreclosure device.14 Chapter 11
Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 589 (2001). Others would go further. See, e.g.,
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 15 (1997);
Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717,
721 (1991).
5. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 64.
6. Id. at 9.
7. United Say. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 365 (1988).
8. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d
Cir. 2011).
9. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, L.L.C. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012).
10. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
11. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 21-23.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 892-95 (2014).
14. See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 445 BR. 143, 153 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("At
the time, the transaction was regarded by many as an admirable, even heroic, achievement that helped
to salvage jobs, preserve going concern values and provide for the orderly transition of many thou-
sands of brokerage accounts to a financially secure firm with the resources to manage and service the
financial assets held in those accounts."). The value of going concern sales has been recognized inter-
nationally as well. Espen Eckbo and Karin Thorburn studied mandatory auctions in Sweden, and
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gives secured creditors far greater ability to maximize the value of their
collateral than would have been available under state law foreclosure re-
gimes. This value maximization can occur through either reorganization
or liquidation in Chapter 11.15 Moreover, control of the debtor's assets
also gives the secured creditor control over governance in bankruptcy.
Control over bankruptcy decisionmaking may, in turn, allow the secured
creditor to capture a disproportionate share of bankruptcy-created value,
or even prevent value maximizing reorganizations. 6 This can result in
harm to the estate and to other creditor constituencies (even where the
secured creditor is undersecured).
The most extreme, but also very common, version of this problem
manifests when an undersecured creditor announces that it has a "blan-
ket lien" on all of the debtor's assets, and that it therefore should have
the unfettered right to determine how to dispose of those assets." Se-
cured creditors often get away with making this argument, but I will seek
to show: that the success of this argument is a product of a failure by lien
lawyers to understand the treatment of liens under bankruptcy law; and,
more importantly, that it reflects a failure by bankruptcy lawyers them-
selves to understand the limited scope of liens under nonbankruptcy law.
The result is that secured lenders, by aggrandizing and overstating the
scope of relatively inefficient state law remedies, have managed to gain a
practical and rhetorical stranglehold over the bankruptcy process. The
result is a paradoxical violation of Jackson's prescription. Just as reor-
ganization should not occur on the backs of the secured creditor, secured
creditors should not be able to use the hostage value of their liens to ex-
tort value and thereby foreclose at the expense of junior creditors.
This Article proceeds in four steps. First, it seeks to establish the le-
gal limits of secured lending under nonbankruptcy law. A secured loan
does not confer a distributional priority ahead of all other claimants
against the debtor-it establishes a property right in specific property
with distinct attributes defined by nonbankruptcy law. A debtor may in-
tend to grant a lender a security interest in all of its assets, but the ability
to do this is not governed by intent; it is governed by property law. Prop-
found that where small companies were involved, the survival rate was relatively high and the values
received compared favorably with the book value of the company. B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S.
Thorburn, Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 38, 48
(2009).
15. This ability derives from the ability to reorganize (and preserve going concern value), 11
U.S.C. § 1129 (2012), or to sell as a going concern outside the ordinary course of business. Id. § 363(b).
As a sale device, bankruptcy holds over compulsory state law processes. First, the Code creates a
"global" estate consisting of all of the debtors property, wherever it may be, or by whomever it is held.
Id. § 541(a). State courts have only local (and longarm) jurisdiction and can reach only local assets.
Second, the trustee-in-bankruptcy (or debtor-in-possession) has the power to sell property of the es-
tate free and clear of liens. Id. § 363(f). This allows the debtor to sell property in bundles that may or
may not track the state law foreclosure regimes and to transfer clear title, shifting the various liens to
the proceeds of sale.
16. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 910.
17. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513-14 (2009).
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erty rights are limited in scope, and the means for effective alienation are
legally regulated and often quite formal." A debtor who intends to grant
a lender a security interest in a particular asset may fail for a variety of
reasons."9 They may not be able to do so under applicable law, or may fail
to do so properly. As a result, the fact that a secured party is under-
secured does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that unsecured credi-
tors will not be entitled to a distribution.
Second, this Article seeks to establish the practical limits of secured
lending under nonbankruptcy law. A secured loan does not confer fee
ownership. Just as one should take a realistic view of the scope of a
lien-what property is covered, it is essential to be realistic about how
much value could actually be realized by the lienholder. A lien, whether
consensual, judicial, or statutory, confers the power to sell the collateral
and credit the proceeds of sale against the outstanding debt.20 That right
to realization is subject to a variety of procedural requirements, from the
comparatively streamlined rules of Article 9 that allow self-help repos-
session and require only notice and commercial reasonableness, 21 to the
comparatively difficult procedures for judicial foreclosure on residential
real property, 2 to the restrictions on the alienation of intellectual proper-
ty licenses. 2 This raises two distinct issues: valuation and timing. What is
the value to which the lienholder is entitled, measured as of when? This
Part of the Article concludes by arguing that, while it is possible for
bankruptcy law to adjust this rule, the baseline entitlement is the value
that could have been received had the creditor pursued its actual state
law remedies. Deviations from this baseline must be justified by policies
other than entitlement.
Third, the Article takes on the second question- timing. In this
Part, I will argue that the value of the secured creditor's entitlement
should be measured as of the petition date, unless the Bankruptcy Code
18. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 914-25.
19. A security interest may fail for a variety of reasons, including failure to comply with formali-
ties of a security interest (see U.C.C. §§ 9-109 (2014), 1-201(b)(35) (2014); U.C.C. § 9-203(a)-(b) or for
failure to perfect a security interest (see U.C.C. §§ 9-308, 9-310, 9-316). See also infra Part I.
20. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(35), 9-607, 9-610; Enforcement of Money Judgments, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5201-03 (McKinney 2006).
21. U.C.C. §§ 9-610, 9-611.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. (1997) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF PROP.]
As the Reporters note in the introductory note to the Restatement:
Lenders in the United States have made use of a variety of real estate security devices. The old-
est, of course, is the mortgage, a legacy of medieval England, and its virtual twin, the deed of
trust. Other devices include the absolute deed as security, the contract for deed, and the "negative
pledge." Lenders developed these instruments because they felt dissatisfied with the mortgage, ei-
ther because its foreclosure procedure was considered unduly cumbersome or because the sub-
stantive protection provided to borrowers was considered excessive. The result has been a pletho-
ra of devices and a corresponding profusion of legal uncertainty in most jurisdictions. The picture
is not a tidy or an efficient one.
Id. at intro.
23. U.C.C. sections 9-406 and 9-408 seek to override legal and contractual restrictions on the
transfer of certain types of property. U.C.C. §§ 9-406, 9-408.
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(the "Code") changes that rule.2 4 Section 552 of the Code stops floating
liens from floating, and limits the secured creditor to collateral held at
the time of bankruptcy and its proceeds - subject to equitable tracing (or,
as section 552 puts it, "the equities"). 2 5 If one takes section 552 seriously
and treats the petition date as a realization moment, then the secured
creditor does not "own" much of what the postbankruptcy debtor cre-
ates. Work of at-will employees is not proceeds of anything owned by the
secured creditor on the petition date." At a certain point, purchased in-
ventory is no longer traceable to collateral owned on bankruptcy day
(though it may be traceable to cash collateral). 27 In other words, if one
takes a realistic (and realist) view of a secured creditor's property rights
in bankruptcy, she "owns" much less than she might assert.
That this sleight of hand often works is not a reason to criticize se-
cured creditors. It results from a failure on the bankruptcy side to distin-
guish a secured creditor's collateral from bankruptcy-created value. This
fourth point is not entirely new. Ronald Mann made a similar point near-
ly two decades ago." Where Mann sought to separate bankruptcy-
created value from the interests of creditors generally, I make a narrower
point by seeking to distinguish what belongs to the secured creditor from
what belongs to the firm. Mann asked whether noncreditor interests
could be considered under bankruptcy, or, to put it another way, what
value could properly be allocated to the "public policy" space.29 I, by con-
trast, seek to allocate value within the firm for distributional purposes in
bankruptcy, and, more importantly, to allocate governance rights, also
within the firm, for the purposes of determining the disposition of the
firm's assets.
The Article concludes with a number of applications of the princi-
ples articulated here to a variety of bankruptcy hot topics. In sum, mod-
24. The anti-lienstripping rules contained in § 1325(a) and § 1111(b)(2) of the Code have the
effect of postponing the secured creditor's moment of realization. Similarly, § 1129(a) measures the
value of the secured creditor's collateral as of the effective date of the plan, but these exceptions prove
the rule. With regard to § 1129(a), usually the assumption is that the value of the collateral will have
declined over time, and the creditor will have received adequate protection payments to preserve full
payment of that value. It can happen that the collateral may increase in value, however, the effect of
this is less clear. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b)(2), 1325(a), 1129(a) (2012).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
26. While employees may be paid with "cash collateral," and some of the postpetition value they
create may be considered proceeds, to the extent that the employee creates value beyond his or her
wages, there is no reason to, and most courts would not, allocate all of the postpetition value to the
secured creditor. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a), (c); In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1997).
28. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It
Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1040 (1995) ("The creditor's bargain with the debtor may entitle it
to any value attributable to the actions of the debtor and its management, but the government's role in
creating and preserving those gains gives it an entitlement to some share of any gains from reorganiza-
tion. Hence, the government is entitled to a say in disposing of that value, which it might exercise in
several ways: by taking some portion of the value for itself through taxes or fees, by delivering it to the
creditors, or by allowing the management or owners of the debtors to retain it.").
29. Id. at 999.
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em bankruptcy practice has turned the Jacksonian prescription on its
head. Jackson argues that unsecured creditors should not be encouraged
to forum shop into bankruptcy to extort value from secured creditors. By
the same logic, secured creditors should not be encouraged to forum
shop into (or use their leverage in) bankruptcy to capture the value of
assets that they do not own. In this regard, careful attention to the limits
of the secured creditor's entitlements under nonbankruptcy law, recogni-
tion of the practical value of those entitlements, and a careful tracing of
those rights during the bankruptcy process, would lead to a very different
allocation of governance rights between secured creditors and other
stakeholders, and to a very different distribution of value at the end of
the case, than is typical under modern practice.
II. THE LEGAL LIMITS OF BLANKET LIENS
At least since 1978, and perhaps longer, law professors and econo-
mists have asked whether it is possible as a legal matter, or should be
possible as a normative matter, for a debtor to transfer all of its assets-
indeed, all of its value-to a consensual lien creditor as security for a
debt." In other words, should a secured creditor be able to bargain for a
lending contract that is supported by a distributional priority in all of the
firm's value (present and future) that is enforceable as a property right,
good against the world? As a normative matter, Jackson and others have
argued that such a hierarchical capital structure would facilitate govern-
ance and efficient allocation of assets." But they concede that this is not
necessarily possible under current law. 3 2
Notwithstanding this concession, investors often speak of "blanket
liens" as if there is such a thing. This assumption comes from a number
of places: a libertarian view of property rights that would allow an owner
to dispose of his or her property in any manner; a "finance-based" ap-
proach that treats secured credit as if it were a global distributional prior-
ity rather a lien on specific property; but, mostly, an inattention to the
30. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (2013); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CH. L. REV.
738,782-83 (1988).
31. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 218.
32. Baird and Jackson argued that a secured creditor should be able to bargain for its security
interest to include the going-concern (or enterprise) value of the debtor, although they did not assert
that this view reflected the law at the time of their publication:
Thus, we believe, a secured creditor with a security interest in specific 'hard' assets should be
treated as having a claim to the asset's liquidation value. Its secured claim should reach no fur-
ther....
This conclusion, however, does not undercut the idea that a creditor should be able to bargain for
a priority interest in the going-concern surplus in priority to other creditors.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 30, at 782-83. See also Baird & Casey, supra note 30, at 17 n.59 (citing
Bargaining After the Fall as defending the liquidation value as the creditor's entitlement).
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limits of lien law.33 It is true that loan documents are often structured to
manifest an intention to encumber all assets in favor of a secured lend-
er:3 mortgages are granted against all real property; leases are assigned;
and an Article 9 security interest is granted in all property that comes
within the scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC").35 This package of conveyances is then described as a "blanket
lien." It is not by any means clear, however, that such a conveyance actu-
ally achieves the stated result, at least insofar as it applies to claims by
third parties against those assets. Whether a purported conveyance of
property is effective is determined by state property law, not contract
law, so one must look beyond the intent of the parties to determine the
legal effect of the transaction, especially with regard to third parties.
To create a mortgage on real property one must comply with the
mortgage law of the state in which the real property lies.36 This may seem
reasonably straightforward, but as evidenced by the recent experience
with the Mortgage Electronic Registration System ("MERS"), it is nec-
essary to pay attention to the vagaries of state law for creation, perfec-
tion, and assignment of these rights."
For personal property, Article 9 makes the lien creation process
reasonably straightforward. 38 One can create the lien by creating an au-
thenticated record memorializing the intended conveyance. 39 One can
perfect it by filing a financing statement, taking possession of certain
types of collateral, and taking control of certain other types of collat-
eral.40 However, the scope of Article 9 is not all-encompassing. It is worth
listing a few examples, because the gaps are not trivial.
First, 9-109 excludes a variety of types of property from the scope of
Article 9.41 Some of these exclusions are purely technical. Some are likely
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012); Carole Patemen, Self Ownership and Property in the Person:
Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 20, 25 (2002).
34. See infra note 46; see also Christopher J. Rockers & Christine Gould Hamm, Exploring the
Possibilities for No. 2: All About Second-Lien Loans, 14 A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2005/01/exploring-possibilities-no2-200
501.authcheckdam.pdf ("A second-lien loan is a loan secured by a lien on part or all of the borrower's
assets.").
35. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2014).
36. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP, supra note 22, at intro. ("[T]here can be no doubt that legal
differences from state to state act as a serious impediment to the carrying out of these business ar-
rangements. A major goal of this Restatement ... is to assist in unifying the law of real property secu-
rity by identifying and articulating legal rules that will meet the legitimate needs of the lending indus-
try while at the same time providing reasonable protection for borrowers.").
37. See Gretchen Morgenson, Mortgage Registry Muddles Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/business/fair-game-mortgage-registry-muddles-foreclosures.html?
r=0.
38. See U.C.C. §§ 9-109, 1-201(b)(35), 9-203(a)-(b).
39. See id.
40. U.C.C. §§ 9-308, 9-310-316.
41. U.C.C. § 9-109(d) excludes from Article 9's scope:
(1) a landlord's lien, other than an agricultural lien;
(2) a lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of law for services or ma-
terials, but section 9-333 applies with respect to priority of the lien;
(3) an assignment of a claim for wages, salary, or other compensation of an employee;
596 [Vol. 2015
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to apply only in "individual" cases, because they protect exempt property
or apply to consumer transactions. But some are significant. The exclu-
sion of many tort claims; real estate; recoupment and setoff; insurance
claims; and so on, make it seem as if a blanket "Article 9" security inter-
est may not be as all-encompassing as it sounds.
This is not to say that many of the excluded items may not be en-
cumberable by other methods. Rather, it merely highlights the fact that a
statement of intent to create a blanket lien by a lender and borrower,
coupled with the filing of an all-encompassing financing statement, does
not necessarily make it so.
A second limitation on the scope of liens can be described as "inal-
ienable property" or "nonproperty." Not all of a firm's value can be sep-
arated from the firm itself. For example, judicial lien creditors have been
held unable to levy on domain names. 2 Some elements of firm value may
not be property at all.43 For example, government-granted licenses that
are personal in nature and nontransferrable, or accumulated corporate
goodwill simply may not be subject to liens." There have been both judi-
cial and statutory attempts to work around this type of gap, but none
have been universally accepted. For example, a number of cases involv-
(4) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes as part of a sale of
the business out of which they arose;
(5) an assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes which is
for the purpose of collection only;
(6) an assignment of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee that is also obligated to
perform under the contract;
(7) an assignment of a single account, payment intangible, or promissory note to an assignee in
full or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness;
(8) a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than
an assignment by or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable and any sub-
sequent assignment of the right to payment, but sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply with respect to
proceeds and priorities in proceeds;
(9) an assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment taken on a right to
payment that was collateral;
(10) a right of recoupment or set-off, but:
(A) Section 9-340 applies with respect to the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or set-
off against deposit accounts; and
(B) Section 9-404 applies with respect to defenses or claims of an account debtor;
(11) the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a lease or rents
thereunder, except to the extent that provision is made for:
(A) liens on real property in sections 9-203 and 9-308;
(B) fixtures in section 9-334;
(C) fixture filings in sections 9-501, 9-502, 9-512, 9-516, and 9-519; and
(D) security agreements covering personal and real property in section 9-604;
(12) an assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim, but sections 9-
315 and 9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds; or
(13) an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but sections 9-315 and 9-322
apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds.
42. See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 80 (Va. 2000).
43. See Straffi v. New Jersey (In re Chris-Don, Inc.), 308 B.R. 214,217 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004).
44. Some things of value to the enterprise (such as government-granted licenses) have been con-
strued not to be property to which an Article 9 security interest can attach. See New Jersey v. Div of
Taxation (In re Chris-Don, Inc.) 367 F. Supp. 2d 696, 696-97 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding that a liquor li-
cense is not property for Article 9 purposes under New Jersey law); Banc of Am. Strategic Solutions,
Inc. v. Cooker Rest. Corp., No. 05AP-1126, 2006 WL 2535734, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2006)
(finding that liquor licenses are not property under Ohio law).
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ing FCC licenses have deemed the value of transferred licenses (realized
in bankruptcy) as proceeds, notwithstanding that the underlying license
was not collateral. 45
A similar attempt is made in sections 9-406 and 9-408 of the UCC.4 6
Those sections override nonassignment clauses contained in contracts,
intellectual property licenses, and government licenses. While section 9-
406 is a complete override, section 9-408 overrides nonassignment provi-
sions only to the extent necessary to allow a security interest to attach,
but not to enforce the lien.47 section 9-408 does not alter, the fact that
these rights would not be realizable by the secured party outside of bank-
ruptcy. Nonetheless, they seek to ensure that any value realized in bank-
ruptcy will be allocated to the secured party as proceeds.48 This is a bold
attempt to use the state law definition of property to alter the federal
bankruptcy definition of proceeds. There is no particular reason to treat
this result as a given or even as intended by Congress. Indeed, if the cred-
itors' allowed secured claim is to be calculated, for adequate protection
purposes, as of the petition date, the realizable value of the lien (outside
of bankruptcy) would be zero.
A third limitation on a secured creditors' lien is that there may be
problems with perfection or priority.49 Liens are property rights, and the
question in bankruptcy is not whether these property rights are enforce-
able against the debtor, but whether they are enforceable against third
parties.so Sometimes a mere paper grant is sufficient,"' but for many types
of property interests, a public filing, the taking of possession or control
may be required to ensure priority over later lien creditors under state
law, or the bankruptcy trustee. 52 Again, loan documents may reflect an
intent to convey a property interest, but unless the appropriate steps are
followed, the promise may be ineffective. Property may fall through the
cracks.
A fourth limitation is the concept of traceable proceeds. Under Ar-
ticle 9 of the UCC, a security interest automatically covers proceeds of
the collateral, if it is sold or otherwise disposed of." That concept of iden-
45. Compare New Bank of New England, N.A. v. Tak Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Tax Commc'ns.,
Inc.), 138 B.R. 568, 568 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding that value of broadcast license is not proceeds of
secured creditor's collateral), with In re Ridgley Commc'ns, Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 374 (Bankr. D. Md.
1992) (holding that value of broadcast license is proceeds of secured creditor's collateral).
46. See U.C.C. §§ 9-406, 9-408.
47. See infra note 55.
48. Whether this will work will turn on the nature of proceeds in bankruptcy. Compare In re
Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294, 294 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002) (holding that insurance claims arising out of elec-
trocution of cattle are proceeds), with Helms v. Certified Packaging Corp. 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that claims for failure to obtain business interruption insurance were not proceeds of
collateral). Also, Article 9's concept of proceeds only reaches property. Straffi v. New Jersey (In re
Chris-Don, Inc.), 308 B.R. 214, 217 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004).
49. See U.C.C. §§ 9-308, 9-310-317; 9-320, 9-322-324.
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012).
51. Bluxome St. Assocs. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 198, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
52. See U.C.C. §§ 9-308,9-310-316.
53. U.C.C. § 9-203(f).
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tifiable proceeds is extended by equitable tracing rules, but only as far as
those rules themselves can reach.? To claim property as proceeds, one
must be able to trace the proceeds to original collateral, subject to a per-
fected security interest." Sometimes this is possible, but often it is not.
Where a blanket lien is involved, outside of bankruptcy, tracing rules
may not matter much because as property changes from one form to an-
other, it may simply float between and among collateral types, changing
from inventory to an account, then to a deposit account and back to in-
ventory. Because the security agreement covers after-acquired property,
no value slips out of the security interests." Similarly, when an employee
develops intellectual property or provides services, the value becomes
collateral as an after-acquired general intangible.17
Tracing becomes crucial in bankruptcy, however. Under section
552(a) of the Code, liens on after-acquired property no longer attach."
To put it another way, floating liens stop floating. By contrast, if the
prepetition security interest covers proceeds, then, when property is sold
by the debtor, the security interest will attach to the proceeds.6 But, sig-
nificantly, after-acquired property only becomes collateral if it is pro-
ceeds of prepetition collateral. The interest in proceeds is only perfected
if the interest in the original collateral was perfected.6 1
It is not uncommon for a putative "blanket lien" creditor to assert
that since it has a lien on all of the debtor's prepetition property, any
postpetition value of the firm must, by definition, be proceeds.62 Such
creditors often get away with it, but they should not. First, postpetition
value may not be a product of prepetition collateral. Just to offer one ex-
ample, imagine that an at-will employee of a software company develops
an algorithm that is extremely valuable postpetition. It is work for hire,
so it belongs to the firm, but it is difficult to figure out how that intellec-
tual property is proceeds of prepetition collateral.63 In a restaurant, the
54. U.C.C. § 9-315(b)(2).
55. See In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 407 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997);
U.C.C. H# 9-102(a)(64)(A), (C), 9-315(a)(2), (c), (d).
56. U.C.C. § 9-204(a).
57. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(42), 9-204.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 552(b).
61. U.C.C. § 9-315(c).
62. In DBSD I, the bankruptcy court permitted secured creditors to make a "gift" of the distri-
butions to which they were entitled to junior classes of creditors. See In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 419
B.R. 179, 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, No. 09 Civ. 10156 (LAK), 2010 WL 1223109 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2010), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 627 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit reversed the
bankruptcy court's finding and held that "the bankruptcy court erred in confirming the plan of reor-
ganization" which included the gift. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2011). The
Second Circuit specifically noted "Congress... did not create any exception for 'gifts' like the one at
issue [in DBSD I]." Id. See also Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 923-24.
63. The argument that the employee was paid with cash collateral does not help. The algorithm
would be property acquired by the debtor when created. The employee would be paid in arrears, well
after the algorithm was created. Similarly, cases involving restaurants distinguish the extent to which
food sold is product of inventory, and the extent to which it is a product of services.
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value contributed by the line cooks and wait staff is not proceeds of in-
ventory, even though a customer technically pays for a meal.6 Section
552 of the Code recognizes this limitation on proceeds when it says that
the proceeds can be limited as required by the "equities of the case. "65
Again, the secured party is entitled to the collateral value that they had
as of the petition date, and that value may be traced through multiple
forms, but that does not eliminate the fact that there is no such thing as
"proceeds in the air." Proceeds must be traceable to prepetition collat-
eral in order for the secured party to be entitled to the value to be at-
tributable to those proceeds/that collateral." In short, even if the debtor
and secured creditor intend to create a blanket lien, the lien holder may
not "own" all of the firm's value. For better or for worse, this has signifi-
cant governance implications. If the secured creditor is not the sole own-
er of the insolvent firm, then it does not have a unilateral right to decide
what to do with the firm's assets. It also sets up a conflict of interest be-
tween the secured creditor and the other claimants. The secured creditor
has an incentive to maximize the value of assets (and to increase the allo-
cation of firm value to liened assets) while the other claimants have an
incentive to maximize the value of the firm as a whole.
III. THE LIMITS OF STATE LAW REMEDIES AND THE CONCEPT OF
BANKRUPTCY-CREATED VALUE
Bankruptcy law is replete with verbal formulations that mandate
the protection of a secured creditor's interest in its collateral: "adequate
protection," "indubitable equivalence," and "value of such interest."6
The common thread is that bankruptcy law respects the secured credi-
tor's property right. But what does that mean? Is the secured creditor en-
titled to the monetary value of its lien, or to the full bundle of state law
entitlements, subject only to the automatic stay? One might view secured
credit solely as a remedy; the secured creditor has chosen secured credit
to ensure an alternate source of recovery. They are therefore entitled to
at least what they would have recovered had they exercised their rights
outside of bankruptcy. Alternatively, one might view the bundle of rights
embodied in the security interest as including the "hostage value."a State
law allows a secured creditor to seize and dispose of the collateral (re-
gardless of the value) in a manner that might impose costs on the debtor
64. In re Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 400, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003). Some courts con-
clude that the food is not proceeds at all. In re Inman, 95 B.R. 479, 480 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1988)
("[Tihe degree of service is not the significant factor for our consideration. Rather, the meritorious
fact we should note is that the restaurant industry, in general, is a service-oriented industry.").
65. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
66. See supra note 55.
67. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 506(a).




far in excess of the value of the collateral itself.' A consumer debtor
might lose her house. An automobile factory might need to shut down
because it cannot operate without the use of a specialized piece of
equipment.
That question was posed squarely in the recent RadLAX case,
where the Supreme Court concluded that a secured creditor did not re-
ceive the "indubitable equivalent" of the value of its collateral for the
purposes of section 1129(b)(2)(A) when the creditor was deprived of the
right to credit bid in a sale of its collateral pursuant to a plan of reorgani-
zation. 0 In RadLAX, the Supreme Court appeared to endorse the second
approach-the right to credit bid was deemed an essential part of the se-
cured creditor's bundle of rights, embodied in the concept of "indubita-
ble equivalence" required by the statute." Credit bidding, though, does
not affect a secured creditor's distributional priority-it simply increases
the creditors' leverage at the foreclosure sale. For reasons I will discuss
below, I believe this to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Con-
gress' approach to liens in the Code, and, more importantly, an approach
that is likely to create significant inefficiencies.
A. Formal Rights v. Realizable Value
As Melissa Jacoby and I have discussed elsewhere, putting aside
whether the Code can or should be used to preserve jobs, protect equity,
or otherwise preserve the value of a firm for noncreditor constituencies,
bankruptcy law can create value for creditors in two distinct ways .72 Most
obviously, Chapter 11 seeks to preserve going concern value by allowing
a firm to continue its business and reform its capital structure by shed-
ding debt.7 1 Chapter 11 provides a way to allocate this loss and distribute
69. Id. at 179-80.
70. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012). The
right to credit bid seems, at first, to be a trivial question for both the creditor and debtor. A secured
creditor who credit bids "pays" for the foreclosed collateral by cancelling the relevant amount of debt.
This simply saves the creditor the trouble of writing a check to the foreclosure trustee and then being
handed the money back as its distribution. While this right appears purely formal, it can significantly
affect the dynamics of a foreclosure sale. Since the secured creditor need not put up cash, it need not
arrange financing before bidding. Similarly, in cases where the deficiency is uncollectible, the secured
creditor can use the threat to credit bid the full amount of the debt to deter possible bidders.
71. Id. at 2027.
72. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 920.
73. As the House Report to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 states:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a busi-
ness's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its credi-
tors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that
assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valua-
ble than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on assets that a business can produce
is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in the business. Cash flow problems may
develop, and require creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-term lenders, to wait
for payment of their claims. If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned
to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it pre-
serves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6179.
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firm value across creditor constituencies through a mixed process of bar-
gaining and compulsion. But Chapter 11 can preserve value in other ways
as well. The value can be preserved by a going concern sale under a plan
of reorganization." Another value preserving aspect of Chapter 11 is
that, in an emergency, it can be used to accomplish a hurry-up, all-asset
sale." Even these liquidations in Chapter 11 will often yield greater reali-
zations than could be achieved under state law liquidation procedures."
Therefore, extending the package of state law rights embodied in "ade-
quate protection," or the "allowed secured claim," beyond the concept of
realizable value gives the holder of such a claim the power to bargain for
a greater value than she would have achieved using her prebankruptcy
state law rights." To the extent that this encourages efficient resolutions,
this is not a problem. To the extent that it allows the secured creditor to
hold out, and exploit the hostage value of its collateral, however, it is
quite problematic. As noted above, the secured creditor who does not
own all of the firm's value has an incentive to maximize the value of its
collateral, rather than to maximize the value of the firm.
Many discussions of a secured creditor's rights confuse the fact that
a security interest is a "property" right with the fact that it is most em-
phatically not an ownership right in fee simple. Real property mortgage
holders, holders of Article 9 security interests, loss payees on an insur-
ance policy, consignees, and other holders of consensual liens cannot
simply realize on their collateral as if they owned it. Their rights are only
triggered by a default. Those rights must be exercised in compliance with
the state's rules for judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure. And, even after
foreclosure, they must wait for the end of any redemption periods and
jump through the appropriate state law hoops for transferring title."
These processes can be time consuming and are not calculated to, and
rarely do, maximize value.79 Bankruptcy law, however, allows the trustee
in bankruptcy to conduct a sale in the manner best calculated to obtain
full value, or if such a sale will not work to reorganize.? To the extent
that this bankruptcy-created value exceeds what would have been ob-
tainable under nonbankruptcy law, it is not by any means clear that the
surplus is "owned" by the secured creditor.81
74. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 911-12, 919.
75. Id. at 931, 940-41.
76. Id. at 892-95.
77. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1008.
78. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 892-95.
79. Id.
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2012).
81. This is not to say that Congress does not have the power to allocate that value to the secured
creditor. However, in the absence of such an allocation, there is no a priori entitlement to that value.
602 [Vol. 2015
LOGIC AND LIMITS
B. Realizable Value and Coordination Problems
The asset-by-asset nature of state law remedies may make it difficult
to accomplish value-maximizing sales of collateral where the debtor is
not cooperating. Loans secured by various assets may be held by diverse
creditors, and loans against different types of assets may be subject to
different procedures for foreclosing." Indeed, where real estate is in-
volved, entirely different state law processes with different deadlines may
be used to effectuate an assignment of lease, as opposed to a real proper-
ty mortgage? Even when one is selling off a company's assets and ceas-
ing operations, how one sells the company's assets may matter a lot. Two
adjoining pieces of real property may be worth more sold together than
separately. A building sold with everything in it, as well as all the tenants
may be worth more than the same building sold empty (or vice versa).
Because state law liens are "asset-by-asset," and because each lien
represents a different bundle of sticks, idiosyncratic and inconsistent
rights may make it difficult or impossible to combine assets and sell them
in value-maximizing packages. While asset consolidation may create a
legal inconvenience, coordination of creditors with claims against partic-
ular assets may be an even bigger problem. Where assets that would best
be combined for sale are held by disparate creditors, holdout problems
can arise and become devilishly complicated to resolve."
The RadLAX holding provides an example of how such problems
arise even with a seemingly innocuous procedural right, like the right to
credit bid. In RadLAX, the Supreme Court held that a secured party that
is denied the right to credit bid is not receiving the "indubitable equiva-
lent" of its allowed secured claim under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the
Code.5 On its face, this ruling seems inconsequential. Credit bidding al-
lows a secured creditor to pay for its purchase at a foreclosure sale by
crediting the price against the outstanding loan. Thus, instead of paying
cash, the purchaser need only cancel debt. This simply relieves the credi-
tor of the need to put up money that will then be returned immediately
on completion of the sale. An absolute right to credit bid, however, could
cause serious inefficiencies under certain circumstances.
For example, imagine a debtor that owns three adjoining pieces of
real estate, purchased with the intention to join them together to build a
large shopping mall. Each plot of land was purchased separately with a
distinct lender and a separate mortgage. Further, imagine that the values
are as follows. Parcel A would sell at foreclosure for $25,000 as a stand-
alone piece of property. It is encumbered by a mortgage debt of
$200,000. Parcel B would similarly sell for $30,000, and is encumbered by
a mortgage of $150,000. Parcel C would sell for $50,000, and is unencum-
82. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 4, at 726-27.
83. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP., supra note 22, at intro.
84. Mann, supra note 68, at 228 n.283.
85. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012).
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bered. Assume further that the three properties, if sold as an assemblage,
could be sold for $135,000. In other words, the three properties are worth
more when sold together than separately. $135,000 is more than
$105,000. The value of the assemblage is also considerably more than
what any of the three creditors would stand to receive if they were to liq-
uidate their collateral under state or separately under bankruptcy law.
However, there is no practical way to allow the creditors to bid the full
amount of their debt against the assemblage. The property being sold is
not all their collateral. If Creditor A is allowed to bid $200,000, it would
be able to purchase all three properties when it contributed assets worth
less than twenty percent of the true value.
The problem arises because bankruptcy sales under section 363(b)
are different from sales under Article 9 and real estate foreclosures. Un-
der state law, the creditor only has the power to sell its own collateral.
Therefore the right to credit bid is axiomatically limited to the right to
bid at a sale of the creditor's own collateral. By contrast, in bankruptcy,
the trustee may liquidate any or all of the debtor's property. Some of if
may be encumbered, some not. The goal is to engineer a value maximiz-
ing sale regardless of the various claims against the assets. Therefore,
some of the property up for sale may be the secured party's collateral,
but other property may not. The problem is that the right to credit bid is
inextricably linked to whether the property being sold is subject to the
creditor's lien. At state law, or in a stand-alone liquidation under Chap-
ter 7, the value of the credit bid would be limited to the realizable value
of that piece of collateral." The additional value of the assemblage is not
something that any of the individual secured creditors could capture. It
can be preserved, however, by the ability that exists under Chapter 11 to
merge the properties and sell them together, free and clear of liens.8 A
broad reading of the RadLAX holding, that "indubitable equivalence" to
the value of collateral under section 1129 includes the right to credit bid,
would have the paradoxical effect of preventing such a value-maximizing
sale.' This undercuts the fundamental goal of Chapter 11. This problem
is not idiosyncratic or unusual. Any time a debtor has multiple secured
lenders with claims on different assets, this problem arises -for example,
where a debtor has separate inventory, receivables, and equipment lend-
ers.
To untangle the knot created by RadLAX, it is necessary to exam-
ine carefully the source of the right to credit bid and to take the concept
of "adequate protection" seriously. The broad reading of RadLAX- that
the secured creditor is entitled to protection of the full panoply of its
state created rights-cannot be correct. The question is: what right is
protected and how? In the remainder of this Section, I will analyze the
86. Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REv. 103,107.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2012).
88. RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2067.
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source and scope of the right to credit bid, and in the next Section, I will
explore the limits of its protection in bankruptcy.
Most discussions of RadLAX treat the right to credit bid as if it is an
incident of state law-a prebankruptcy right that is preserved by the con-
cept of "indubitable equivalence" in section 1129(b). Nothing in the Su-
preme Court's opinion undercuts this assumption, but the example above
shows that this cannot be the case. If all of a secured creditor's state law
rights are protected, then each secured creditor will have an effective ve-
to on a potentially value-maximizing sale or reorganization. While a right
to credit bid does exist under state law, the right to credit bid at issue in
RadLAX is a product of federal law, contained in section 363(k) of the
Code.' Unlike the seemingly absolute right to credit bid under state law,
the right under section 363(k) can be limited for cause (presumably in-
cluding the need to conduct a going concern sale)."0
In short, while the modern rhetoric of secured creditors' rights fo-
cuses on formal rights under state law, the Code would appear to protect
the value of that right, but not necessarily its formal attributes.
C. Adequate Protection of What?
This focus on the economic value of a lien rather than its formal in-
cidents finds textual support in the Code's related concepts of the "al-
lowed secured claim," and "adequate protection." Under section 361,
"adequate protection" protects the secured creditor to the extent that
"the stay. . . , use, sale, or lease . . . , or any grant of a lien under section
364 of this title results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest
in such property."9' This is the same verbal formulation as is used in sec-
tion 506 and in section 1129(b)(1)(A)." It is also the baseline against
which "indubitable equivalence" is measured. The question raised is,
what is the relevant moment for valuing the claim? As a logical matter,
the baseline for adequate protection should be measured based on what
the secured creditor would get if the stay was lifted, and if the debtor was
to abandon the collateral. In other words, the baseline entitlement is
what the secured creditor would be able to obtain if the creditor pursued
nonbankruptcy remedies.
There are, again, two ways of looking at what a creditor has under
state law: formally and practically. As a formal matter, for example, the
creditor has the absolute right to credit bid under state law. However, as
a practical matter, this state law right to credit bid could only be exer-
cised in a state law foreclosure. To put it another way, the formal rights
under state law are only relevant to the extent that they allow a creditor
to realize value under state law. The formal right to credit bid must be
89. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k).
90. Id.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (emphasis added).
92. See 11 U.S.C. §H 506, 1129(b)(1)(A).
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balanced against what the creditor could actually obtain under state law
processes that (1) are generally far more cumbersome than the Code, (2)
preclude assembling the property in value maximizing packages, and (3)
provide only the power to convey the title that the particular foreclosing
creditor has the power to convey, with any title infirmities that may ex-
ist." This is not to say that a secured creditor may not be able to obtain
more in bankruptcy, or even that the statute might not allocate some
bankruptcy created value to the secured creditor. It is only to say that
when one considers the concept of "adequate protection," and hence
"indubitable equivalence," one must start from the baseline of what the
creditor could actually receive.94
Not only is this view of "adequate protection" rooted in the Code, it
also finds support in a symmetric reading of Jackson and Baird's "credi-
tor's bargain." 5 As both Baird and Jackson have argued, bankruptcy is
favored over state law when bankruptcy processes produce greater value
for the estate as a whole than state law processes." They argue, however,
the law should not be structured to encourage one creditor constituency
to file bankruptcy based on a group-specific bankruptcy priority.' The
implication is that creditors' entitlements are shaped by what they would
have received under state law, but value created in and by bankruptcy
processes should be shared, unless there is a good reason to reallocate it.
Formal rights like credit bidding or rights to delay realization give the se-
cured creditor the power to exercise hostage value with regard to its col-
lateral after the case has been filed. 8
D. Allocating Bankruptcy Created Value
After distinguishing the practical monetary value of a secured credi-
tor's collateral from the formal rights of a secured creditor under state
law, it becomes possible to distinguish value that is created by procedures
available only under bankruptcy law from value that is owned by the se-
cured creditor prior to bankruptcy. As such, even when a secured credi-
tor claims to have a blanket lien on all of a debtor's assets, there may be
value in the debtor firm that is not owned by the secured creditor. 9
There are assets that could not be efficiently realized under the state
property law because of cumbersome remedies or assemblage prob-
lems. 0 There are assets that could not be reached at all under state law,
93. See, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/15 (2014); see also Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 921.
94. Indeed, the right to credit bid that is discussed in Radlax, is not a state law right, but a right
under federal law conferred by section 363(k) of the Code.
95. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 97 (1984).
96. Id. at 126.
97. Id. at 100.
98. Id. at 117.
99. See supra Part I.
100. See supra Part H.
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or whose value could only be realized in bankruptcy (such as software or
government licenses)."o' Finally, there is going concern value that could
only be realized in bankruptcy.102 This going concern value inheres in the
firm, rather than the assets themselves. However, it is a fair question to
ask whether the value that the secured party should receive is the value
that could be realized on sale, or the value to the debtor of the asset. The
key point here is that the answer to that question does not turn on the
secured party's state law rights. As a practical matter, that value is de-
termined by the availability of substitutes, the cost of replacing the se-
cured party's collateral, and so on. As a legal matter, allocating that val-
ue is a question of federal law under the Code.
E. Bankruptcy-Created Value and the Creditors' Bargain
In The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy, Jackson makes a normative
argument against bankruptcy-specific priorities. Jackson argues that pri-
orities for unsecured creditors or equity holders that exist only in bank-
ruptcy will create an incentive for forum shopping into bankruptcy in or-
der to favorably reallocate the debtor's value.' The realities of modern
bankruptcy practice have turned Jackson's argument on its head. For a
variety of reasons, secured creditors now often prefer to liquidate their
assets in bankruptcy rather than relying on their state law remedies."'
This preference derives from a number of the attributes of bankruptcy
sales discussed above. First, there is the ability to sell the assets in value-
maximizing packages. 0 In bankruptcy, a debtor can sell a whole division,
or a group of buildings, in a way that is calculated to maximize value.
Such a sale could not be compelled under state law. Second, bankruptcy
law provides the ability to convey clear title through the power to sell
free and clear of encumbrances under section 363(f).1o This increases the
value realizable by the estate and the secured party on its collateral, be-
cause the purchaser knows that she will take clear title and thus will not
have to invest in dealing with junior liens and other encumbrances (some
of which may be known, some of which may not be), all of which may be
expensive. Third, bankruptcy law provides the ability to move quickly.
Bankruptcy sales can be accomplished in a matter of days, where state
101. On this analysis, one might conclude that proceeds of a software license might be "collateral"
for the purpose of determining what is available to satisfy the secured creditors' claim, but might not
be included in the "value of the creditor's interest in the debtor's interest in the collateral" for the
purpose of calculating the allowed amount of the secured creditors claim. In re Rowland, 166 B.R. 172,
175 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994).
102. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 894-95.
103. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 21-22.
104. See, e.g., W.D. Adkins, Definition of Liquidation Priority, CHRON.COM (HOUST. CHRON.),
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/definition-liquidation-priority-36955.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2014)
(describing that secured creditors get paid before all unsecured creditors in a liquidation proceeding).
105. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 892-95.
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012).
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law judicial foreclosures can take months or even years.'" These various
items are all value-creating, and are acceptable reasons for a secured
creditor's decision to forum shop into them.
There are, however, other aspects of bankruptcy practice that allow
the secured party to capture both bankruptcy-created value and value
that may not actually have been theirs to begin with. The list is quite
long, but a few of these include: defensive provisions in a debtor-in-
possession financing order that may allow a secured party to take control
over the liquidation and allocate all of the value to itself;os compelling a
quick sale to maximize the effect of an information asymmetry or uncer-
tainty about value; the concept of proceeds may be used in bankruptcy to
realize on and capture value that was not accessible to the secured credi-
tor outside of bankruptcy; and various asset partitioning strategies such
as securitization may be used to grab control over a key asset and main-
tain control over the case." Here the conflict of interest between the as-
set value maximization strategy of the secured creditor and the firm val-
ue maximizing goals of the Code are in conflict. This second group of
bankruptcy-specific powers allows the secured party to undercut the val-
ue maximizing and equality oriented policies of the Code. When secured
creditors forum shop into bankruptcy to appropriate value, the logic of
lien priority breaks down.
IV. REALIZATION AND TIMING
In this Article so far, I have sought to show that the distributional
baseline for secured creditors should be determined based on the value
that could actually be realized if state law compulsory remedies were ex-
ercised. The approach is to recognize that with bankruptcy law or with-
out it, the general default of a debtor constitutes a realization event for
the secured creditor with regard to its collateral. This was the logic out-
side of bankruptcy of default on bankruptcy clauses, ipso facto clauses,
acceleration provisions, and so on.no Bankruptcy law both crystalizes that
moment of realization and respects the rights that existed as of that mo-
ment. It then replaces the state law first-in-time regime with a collective
approach that seeks to maximize value while treating similarly situated
creditors (as of the petition date) in the same manner. This snapshot is
effectuated in a number of ways. For unsecured creditors, interest stops
107. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 13, at 878-80.
108. Defensive provisions in debtor-in-possession financing orders were addressed in Shapiro v.
Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1992) and Lyondell
Chem. Co. v. Center Point Energy Gas Servs. Inc. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 402 B.R. 571, 594-95
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
109. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 287,288 (2001).
110. These provisions all make an act of bankruptcy or the debtor's financial condition a default
under the contract, so that the creditor need not await a payment default to exercise its remedies and
participate in the race to the courthouse.
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accruing."' For secured creditors, the allowed secured claim can now be
calculated under section 506, and the baseline for adequate protection is
established.112 I have already explained why adequate protection is based
on the amount recoverable on the petition date. A second underappreci-
ated concept that establishes the distributional baseline is the concept of
the equities under section 552 of the Code, and the "no moving up" rule
for lien avoidance under section 551, discussed in the next Section.113
A. Preserving Relative Creditor Positions
Sections 551 and 552 freeze the relative positions of creditors as of
the bankruptcy petition date."4 The concept is not perfectly honored, but
exceptions are clearly that, exceptions. First, section 551 of the Code that
preserves avoided liens for the benefit of the estate."' This freezes the
relative position of secured creditors and the estate by preventing "mov-
ing up." Second, section 552 prevents collateral expansion.'16 That sec-
tion recognizes that if floating liens were allowed to continue to float, as
the case continued, all of the property would run through the floating
lien, and floating lien creditors would improve their lien positions over
time."' To protect secured creditors whose collateral is sold, however,
section 552 also attaches the lien to any proceeds of sale, thereby pre-
serving the value of the lien, even if the identity of the collateral chang-
es.118
This concept of proceeds has become one of the major pressure
points for secured creditors. As noted above, the UCC allows security
interests to attach to property that could not be liquidated under state
law, but then if the property is sold, the UCC seeks to capture the pro-
ceeds." 9 In addition, as a debtor operates, cash collateral may turn into
inventory, which turns into even more cash, which turns into even more
inventory and other items. The result is that proceeds can expand in
much the same way as floating liens. This is where the bankruptcy law-
yers have failed to respond to the challenge of secured creditors. They
miss the importance of the last sentence of section 552(b), that allows the
judge to limit the interest in proceeds as the "equities" require.12 0 This is
a reference not just to vague concepts of equity, but also to equitable
tracing rules, and the idea that the secured creditor's position vis a vis
111. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).
112. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 362.
113. 11 U.S.C. H§ 551, 552(b).
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 551.
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 552. For unsecured creditors, this "snapshot" approach is given effect by the
disallowance of claims for unmatured interest under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
117. See id. Indeed, If floating lines continued to float, then it would likely be possible for a se-
cured creditor to lien all of the value of a debtor.
118. Id.
119. See U.C.C. § 9-315 (2014).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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other claimants should affix to a mass of collateral of consistent value
(even if its identity changes).121 This principle is implicit in the concept
articulated above, that filing for bankruptcy is a realization event for the
secured creditor.
As I argued above, much value created postpetition is not properly
traceable to prepetition collateral. Given, however, that collateral is used
postpetition, sold, commingled and otherwise shifted in form, courts have
struggled to allocate a commingled mass of proceeds that, while tracea-
ble, are no longer identifiable.'22 If the Code held firmly to a "filing is re-
alization of value" line, the case law would be much simpler and clearer.
Valuation and lien stripping would occur as of the petition date, and the
secured claim would float over the floating mass of debtor collateral in a
fixed amount (with or without interest, depending on whether the credi-
tor was over or undersecured). This is not the approach that has been
taken by all courts, however. Increases in value of items of collateral dur-
ing the pendency of the stay may be allocated to the secured party.2 3 In
other cases, courts have struggled to allocate proceeds and nonproceeds
components to the increased value of collateral. In one case, for example
a court sought to determine how much of the value of a dairy farm's milk
was allocable to the cow (collateral) and to the pasturage, labor, food,
and water (noncollateral).1 2 4 The court concluded that the increase in
value of the milk over its inputs would be shared pro rata between the
secured creditor and the estate.' By contrast, in another case, the court
allocated all of the increase in value to the secured party, and reserved to
the estate only the cost of the inputs.126
B. Exceptions that Prove the Rule
The preservation of relative creditor position is not uniform
throughout the Code. There are a number of exceptions, but those ex-
ceptions prove the rule. The largest category is the "anti-lienstripping"
rule contained in sections 1325(a) and 1111(b).1 27 The general rule is that
when an undersecured creditor's claim is allowed, it is allowed at the val-
ue of the collateral, and the deficiency is fixed as of that moment.1 28 The
anti-lienstripping rules allow the secured creditor to capture increases in
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Janet McFarland & Jeff Gray, Pensioners Take on Nortel Bondholders Over Divi-
sion of Assets, GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 29, 2014, 8:19 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-
on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/creditors-take-on-nortel-over-underfunded-pension-plan/
articlel8331459/.
124. In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484,490 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
125. Id. at 491.
126. In re Gunnison Ctr. Apartments, LP, 320 B.R. 391, 405 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005).
127. See 11 U.S.C. §H 1111(b), 1325(a).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
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collateral value that occur during the life of a plan.129 A second place
where the value of a secured creditor's collateral can increase is where a
single piece of encumbered collateral increases in value during the life of
the case.'" There is no inequity where the delay works to the creditor's
benefit and the particular asset was never going to be available to other
creditors.
C. Conclusions
In sum, bankruptcy practice has lost sight of the fact that: (1) liens
are property rights that are limited by the scope of the nonbankruptcy
regimes that create them; (2) they attach to specific assets rather than
providing a generalized distributional priority; (3) while creditors may
wish to liquidate their collateral in bankruptcy for efficiency-based rea-
sons, there is no reason to encourage them to use bankruptcy in order to
reallocate value; (4) for this reason, the distributional baseline for se-
cured creditors should be measured based on what could be obtained by
the secured creditor exercising his nonbankruptcy rights, as of the peti-
tion date; and (5) deviations from this principle should be expressly stat-
ed in the statute.
V. APPLICATIONS
The extent to which bankruptcy courts have forgotten that liens are
asset-specific property rights, limited in scope by their state law origins, is
illustrated by a number of recent cases. In the Buffets Holdings Case, the
secured creditor had a lien on "all assets" except for some of the leases."'
The lien included general intangibles.132 The secured creditors claimed a
right to all postpetition goodwill.' The creditors' committee argued that
goodwill did not include goodwill attributable to the leases that were not
collateral. The bankruptcy court agreed, however, with the secured credi-
tor, stating that goodwill was a "general intangible" covered by the secu-
rity agreement.'3 Even if one concedes that the secured creditors had a
lien on all of the goodwill as of the petition date, postpetition goodwill is
not necessarily proceeds of prepetition goodwill, nor is an increase in
goodwill necessarily attributable to the prepetition goodwill. In sum, this
opinion ignores the fundamental principle of proceeds-there cannot be
a security interest in proceeds unless there is a security interest in the
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (cannot modify rights of holders of secured claims secured by in-
terest in real property used as a principal residence); id. § 1325(a)(5).
130. Id. § 1325(a)(5).
131. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion of Credit Suisse, Cayman Islands
Branch, to Partially Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, OCB Rest. Co., v. Vlahakis (In re Buffets Hold-
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original collateral. Cases like this go well beyond what a secured creditor
could obtain outside of bankruptcy. Because they allow the secured cred-
itor to leverage a security interest in prepetition assets into ownership of
enterprise value, they violate the fundamental principle of bankruptcy-
equality of treatment-that would preserve the relative position of credi-
tors as of the petition date.
Buffets is not unusual in this regard. In Ridgley Communications,
the court held that the value of a broadcast license to which the security
interest could not attach prepetition (it was before the enactment of 9-
406 and 9-408), was nonetheless proceeds, and subject to the secured
creditor's prepetition lien.' By contrast, in his recent ResCap opinion,
discussed in more detail below, Judge Glenn held that the secured credi-
tor had failed to meet its burden of proving the value of prepetition
goodwill and was not entitled to goodwill acquired postpetition that was
not proceeds.' 6
A second type of case where secured creditors have been able to
leverage fictitious state law entitlements into valuable bankruptcy distri-
butions is in the so-called "gifting" cases-the most prominent being the
Dish Network case.' In that case, the senior secured lender asserted a
blanket lien on all of the debtor's assets, and then sought to "gift" a por-
tion of its distribution to former equity.38 The creditors objected arguing
that this violated the absolute priority rule by paying shareholders with-
out paying unsecured creditors in full.'3 9 The secured lender said that this
was not a violation because it was simply choosing what to do with its
own property.14 0 The bankruptcy court agreed with the secured lender
and permitted the gift.141 The Second Circuit reversed, however, and
treated the gift as a violation of the absolute priority rule.1 4 2
Another example of the confusion I describe arises in the credit
bidding context. I have already described how the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in RadLAX took an overly formal view of "indubitable equiva-
lence."'4 3 As I explained, protecting the right to credit bid can obstruct
value-maximizing sales in various ways where a single creditor does not
own all of the assets being sold. In Fisker Automotive, the court recog-
nized this problem, and came up with a novel solution.1 " The court used
section 363(k) to limit the right to credit bid.1 45 As a statutory matter, this
135. In re Ridgely Commc'ns, Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 376 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
136. In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549, 616 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
137. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.
2011).
138. Id. at 86-88.
139. Id. at 85.
140. See id. at 97.
141. Id. at 87; see also In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD 1), 419 B.R. 179, 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009).
142. Dish Network, 634 F.3d at 108 (remanded in part).
143. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065,2070-73 (2012).
144. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55,59 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
145. Id. at 59-60; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2012).
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makes sense. The tricky part is figuring out how to set the value for the
limit on the credit bid. The court in Fisker used the amount that the
holder of the debt had paid for the claim.'" This has been criticized as
arbitrary, and it appears to fly in the face of many earlier bankruptcy de-
cisions that allow claims buyers to assert their full claim regardless of the
purchase price.1 47 On the other hand, the price paid for the claim does re-
flect a market valuation of the collateral.
In a later case, Free-Lance Star Publishing,148 the court reached a
similar result but did a better job of explaining its reasons for capping the
secured creditor's bid. In that case, a creditor purchased a secured claim
with the clear goal of acquiring the company. They engaged in a variety
of practices, prepetition, aimed at increasing the scope of their lien, and
then used their control over the debtor to seek an accelerated sale pro-
cess that would allow them to bid the full amount of their claim, while
reducing the likelihood that other bidders might appear.149 In response to
this inequitable behavior, the court limited the right to credit bid to the
value of the collateral.5 0 While the secured creditor was ultimately able
to purchase the company at the 363 sale, they were only able to credit bid
a portion of the price and had to pay cash for the rest.'
Both Fisker and Free-Lance Star focus not on the claim, but on the
lien. They recognize that a secured creditor only has the right to credit
bid on his own collateral. Therefore, where there is property that the
creditor does not own, the right to credit bid must either be allocated to
his collateral or limited to the value of his collateral. In both of these cas-
es, the court rested its decision, at least in part, on inequitable conduct by
the secured creditor,'5 2 but the problem would have existed in any event.
Finally, and most importantly, there is Judge Glenn's recent opinion
in the ResCap case.15 3 That case appears to capture the approach to valu-
ation articulated in this Article, in particular the focus on realizable val-
ue. In ResCap, the debtor had consented to the use of cash collateral in
return for postpetition liens to secure their adequate protection claims.'5 4
They did not, however, agree in advance to a baseline value of the collat-
eral for determining the diminution during the case."' Judge Glenn held
146. Fisker, 510 B.R. at 59-61.
147. See, e.g., Nelly Almeida, A Recent Decision in the Fisker Case Brings New Life to the Credit
Bidding Debate, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Jan. 27, 2014), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/
asset-sales/a-recent-decision-in-the-fisker-case-brings-new-life-to-the-credit-bidding-debate; G. Ray
Warner, Slam Dunk for Credit Bid Cap, GT RESTRUCTURING REv. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.gt
restructuringreview.com/2014/02/slam-dunk-for-credit-bid-cap/.
148. In re The Free Lance-Star Publ'g Co., 512 B.R. 798, 806-07 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 808.
151. Id. at 807-08.
152. Id. at 806; In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55, 61 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
153. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Capital, LLC
(ResCap)), 501 B.R. 549, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
154. Id. at 571.
155. Id. at 572.
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a trial to determine that value, making clear that the relevant question
was the value of the collateral at the commencement of the case, and that
the burden was on the claimant to prove diminution in value.5 6 Judge
Glenn looked to the text of the section, and considered the "value" of
the creditor's interest in the collateral.157
The creditor pointed to the second sentence of 506(a) that says that
the valuation inquiry should consider the "purpose of the valuation and
the proposed disposition" of the collateral.'s Some of the assets were be-
ing sold as a going concern, while others were being sold piecemeal. The
argument was that the focus should be on the value to the debtor, and
therefore the assets being sold as a going concern should be valued at fair
market value.5 9 While Judge Glenn accepted the argument that assets
sold as a going concern should be valued differently, he also focused on
the fact that the relevant going concern value was the value on the peti-
tion date, including the elements of financial distress that would have de-
pressed their value had they been sold on the petition date.'60 As a result,
Glenn concluded that the creditor had not met its burden of showing
diminution in value.'6 '
There is a small difference between the ResCap approach and the
approach that I have advocated in this Article. I have suggested that the
distributional baseline is the amount realizable under state law compul-
sory remedies. Glenn focuses instead on the value realizable by the debt-
or by any manner of sale as of the petition date, including a going con-
cern sale.1 62 Arguably, this is unrealistic, in that the only way to have
realized this value as of the petition date would be through a consensual
sale. If such a consensual sale had been possible, bankruptcy would not
have been necessary. This is a small difference, however. The approach
followed by Judge Glenn does recognize the distinction between the val-
ue of the lien and bankruptcy created value, and most importantly, fo-
cuses the inquiry on the question of realizable value.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to fill in the half of the equation left
unwritten by Jackson. While Jackson focused on the proper goals of
bankruptcy law and the limits of its aspirations, he did not place any lim-
its on the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy. Jackson's limiting
principle for bankruptcy law-every claimant should get at least as much
as she would get outside of bankruptcy-also establishes a limiting prin-
156. Id. at 577-78, 590-91.
157. Id. at 592.
158. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 595-597.
161. Id. at 595.
162. Id. at 597.
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ciple for secured creditor entitlements. Secured creditors "own" what
they own outside of bankruptcy. If they get more through bankruptcy,
either because the statute allocates value to them, or because of bank-
ruptcy-created value, that is a gift, not property they are entitled to as a
matter of right. This Article seeks to establish three key points, and de-
velop their implications. The points are (1) an ownership rule, (2) a reali-
zation rule, and (3) an equitable tracing-or "no moving up"-rule. The
ownership rule is that baseline entitlements in bankruptcy are estab-
lished by what could have actually been realized outside of bankruptcy.
The realization rule is that, unless the statute specifies otherwise, the
baseline entitlement is valued as of the petition date. The equitable trac-
ing rule uses a rigorous application of the concept of proceeds to freeze
the relative position of creditors on the date of the bankruptcy filing, and
limit the ability of secured creditors to use their property-based claims to
"roll up" all of the bankruptcy-created value. These three rules, if ap-
plied consistently, should encourage efficient value-maximizing govern-
ance of the debtor firm and fair allocation of bankruptcy-created value
among its creditors.
616 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015
